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Children’s Memory for Conversations
About Sexual Abuse: Legal and
Psychological Implications
Thomas D. Lyon* & Stacia N. Stolzenberg**

I. INTRODUCTION

The legal and psychological literature on children’s testimony
in child sexual abuse cases has largely focused on whether
children are allowed to testify, how children testify, and what
happens after they do. Those concerned about false convictions
have emphasized the benefits of mechanisms to exclude children’s
testimony that is unreliable because of pre-trial influence or
developmental immaturity1 and the utility of expert testimony on
children’s suggestibility.2 Those concerned about false acquittals
have argued for eliminating barriers to receiving children’s
* Thomas D. Lyon is the Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Guirado Chair in Law
and Psychology at the University of Southern California. The research
described in this paper was supported by NICHD Grant HD047290. We
thank Vera Chelyapov, Alexander Dumer, Pratusha Erraballi, Emma StokesRaab, Christen Phillips and Jennifer Mascia for their research assistance.
** Stacia N. Stolzenberg is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at the
** Stacia N. Stolzenberg is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at the
University of Southern California.
1. See, e.g., Laurie Shanks, Evaluating Children’s Competency to
Testify: Developing a Rational Method to Assess a Young Child’s Capacity to
Offer Reliable Testimony in Cases Alleging Sexual Abuse, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
575, 580–81, 593–94 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Livia L. Gilstrap, Kristina Fritz, Amanda Torres, & Annika
Melinder, Child Witnesses: Common Ground and Controversies in the
Scientific Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 59, 71–73 (2005); Julie A.
Buck, Kamala London & Daniel B. Wright, Expert Testimony Regarding
Child Witnesses: Does it Sensitize Jurors to Forensic Interview Quality?, 35 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 152, 153 (2011).
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testimony,3 the benefits of setting up special devices (such as
screens or closed-circuit television) for receiving testimony,4 and
the utility of expert testimony on child sexual abuse
accommodation.5 Both sides of the debate have emphasized the
extent to which children’s reports are subject to adult influence.6
Those skeptical of children’s abuse claims have emphasized the
influence of suspicious adults and overzealous investigators,
whereas those inclined to believe children’s reports have
emphasized the influence of perpetrators (and the adults aligned
with perpetrators).7
There are two other adults whose influence over child
witnesses has received less attention: the prosecutor and the
defense attorney. Despite the widespread calls for reform to the
trial process, the most important evidence in the majority of child
sexual abuse cases is still likely to be the child’s testimony in open
court. Given the expense and time necessary to retain experts,
they are unlikely to testify in any more than a small minority of
cases.8 Although child abuse prosecutions in other countries have
been modified to accommodate children’s special needs,
3. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon, Assessing the Competency of Child
Witnesses: Best Practice Informed by Psychology and Law, in CHILDREN’S
TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 69
(Michael E. Lamb et al. eds., 2011).
4. See, e.g., SUSAN R. HALL & BRUCE D. SALES, COURTROOM
MODIFICATIONS FOR CHILD WITNESSES: LAW AND SCIENCE IN FORENSIC
EVALUATIONS (2008); Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who
Allege Sexual Abuse: Why Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child
Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 239, 253–56, 267–77 (2010); Sophia
Rowlands, Cole’s Law Confronts Constitutional Issues: Expanding the
Availability of Closed-Circuit Child Testimony in the Face of the
Confrontation Clause, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 294, 295–96, 298 (2006).
5. See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse
Litigation: Consensus and Confusion, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y, 1, 46–
48 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Shanks, supra note 1; Gilstrap et al., supra note 2; see also
Buck et al., supra note 2; Lyon, supra note 3.
7. See Shanks, supra note 1; Gilstrap et al., supra note 2; Buck et al.,
supra note 2.
8. For example, we examined final arguments in 189 cases of child
sexual abuse and found that expert testimony for the prosecution explaining
the dynamics of child sexual abuse was offered in only 9% of the cases. See,
e.g., Stacia N. Stolzenberg & Thomas D. Lyon, Evidence Summarized in
Attorney’s Closing Arguments Predicts Case Outcome in Criminal Trials of
Sexual Abuse (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Stolzenberg & Lyon, Evidence Summarized].
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prosecutors in the United States tend to remain reliant on
children’s testimony, usually eschewing special procedures that
would prevent the jury from seeing the child live in court.9 This
reliance is especially likely to continue given the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, which found
that uncross-examined testimonial hearsay violates the
confrontation rights of criminal defendants.10 Moreover, even in
countries that have adopted quite radical reforms (at least by U.S.
standards) such as substituting a videotaped forensic interview for
children’s testimony, it is still thought to be important to allow the
defense to cross-examine the child on the stand.11
Hence, the kinds of questions that children are asked in court
by prosecutors and defense attorneys remain of central
importance in assessing the outcome of criminal prosecutions in
abuse cases. A small but growing literature has examined
attorney-child interactions in court. Two themes are predominant.
The first concerns question types, mainly focusing on defense
attorneys, and typically concluding that defense attorneys’
questions are more leading and linguistically more confusing than
prosecutors’.12 It has long been known that leading questions can
9.
See John E.B. Myers, Allison D. Redlich, Gail S. Goodman, Lori P.
Prizmich, Edward Imwinkelried, Jurors’ Perceptions of Hearsay in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 411 (1999).
10. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
11. See Rachel Zajac & Paula Cannan, Cross-examination of Sexual
Assault Complainants: A Developmental Comparison, 16 PSYCHIATRY
PSYCHOL. & LAW S36, S37 (2009); Rachel Zajac & Harlene Hayne, The
Negative Effect of Cross-Examination Style Questioning on Children’s
Accuracy: Older Children Are Not Immune, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
3 (2006) [hereinafter Zajac & Hayne, The Negative Effect of CrossExamination].
12. See JUDY CASHMORE WITH NICOLA DE HAAS, THE USE OF CLOSED
CIRCUIT TELEVISION FOR CHILD WITNESSES IN THE ACT. SYDNEY: AUSTRALIAN
LAW REFORM COMMISSION (1992); Emma Davies & Fred W. Seymour,
Questioning Child Complainants of Sexual Abuse: Analysis of Criminal Court
Transcripts in New Zealand, 5 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 47, 54–57 (2009);
Gail S. Goodman, Elizabeth Pyle Taub, David P. H. Jones, Patricia England,
Linda K. Port, Leslie Rudy, Lydia Prado, John E.B. Myers & Gary B. Melton,
Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault
Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y RES. CHILD DEV. 1, 80 (1992); Zajac &
Cannan, supra note 11, at S47–S48; Rachel Zajac, Julien Gross and Harlene
Hayne, Asked and Answered: Questioning Children in the Courtroom, 10
PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 199, 206 (2003) [hereinafter Zajac et al., Asked
and Answered]; but see Angela D. Evans, Kang Lee & Thomas D. Lyon,
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undermine children’s reliability. With respect to linguistic
difficulty, lab studies have shown that children err frequently and
fail to ask for clarification.13
The second theme concerns
attorneys’ case strategies, again focused on defense attorneys,
with researchers emphasizing defense attorneys’ attempts to
imply that children’s memories have been tainted or that children
are dishonest.14 In a pioneering series of studies, Zajac and her
colleagues have shown that cross-examinations combining
complex and leading questions lead a large percentage of children
to change their stories, thus reducing the reliability of their
testimony.15
This research makes an important contribution to our
understanding of what occurs in the courtroom, but it is limited in
several respects. First, permissible and impermissible approaches
are not distinguished. Leading questions are routinely allowed on
cross-examination in the United States and elsewhere, and
defense attorneys in other jurisdictions are required to directly
challenge child witnesses with their theories of the case.16 In
contrast, many complex questions are objectionable, either on the
generic grounds of being “vague” or “ambiguous” or on the grounds
of
statutes
that
specifically
prohibit
developmentally
Complex Questions Asked by Defense Lawyers But Not Prosecutors Predict
Convictions in Child Abuse Trials, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV., 258, 262 (2009);
Kristen Hanna, Emma Davies, Charles Crothers and Emily Henderson,
Questioning Child Witnesses in New Zealand’s Criminal Justice System: Is
Cross-Examination Fair?, 19 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 530, 535 (2012).
13. See Nancy W. Perry, Bradley D. McAuliff, Paulette Tam, Linda
Claycomb, Colleen Dostal, & Cameron Flanagan, When Lawyers Question
Children. Is Justice Served?, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 609, 625 (1995); Cathleen
A. Carter, Bette L. Bottoms & Murray Levine, Linguistic and Socioemotional
Influences on the Accuracy of Children's Reports, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV., 335,
349 (1996).
14. See Mark Brennan, The Battle For Credibility–Themes in the Cross
Examination of Child Victim Witnesses, 7 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 51, 53–54
(1994); Hanna, supra note 12, at 541; Elizabeth Mertz & Kimberly A.
Lonsway, The Power of Denial: Individual and Cultural Constructions of
Child Sexual Abuse, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1415, 1424 (1998).
15. See Rachel Zajac, Sarah O’Neill & Harlene Hayne, Disorder in the
Courtroom? Child Witnesses Under Cross-Examination, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL
REV. 181, 186 (2012) [hereinafter Disorder in The Courtroom].
16. Rachel Zajac & Harlene Hayne, I Don’t Think That is Really What
Happened: The Effect of Cross-Examination on the Accuracy of Children’s
Reports, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 187, 191–93 (2003)
[hereinafter Zajac & Harlene, I Don’t Think That is Really What Happened].
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inappropriate questions.17 Second, problems with prosecutors’
questions are largely overlooked. Prosecutors’ questions are often
as complex as defense attorneys’.18 Although their questions are
not as leading, they tend to be closed-ended,19 and are therefore
less productive and more error-prone than open-ended questions.20
Third, subtle difficulties may be overlooked. For example, the
complex questions studied in the lab tend to be obviously difficult,
at least to adults.21 If the complexities are obvious, then greater
vigilance on the part of judges and attorneys could solve the
problems. But if the problems are subtle, either special training is
necessary or questioning should be taken out of the attorneys’
hands altogether.
Furthermore, subtle problems are as likely to occur in the
prosecutor’s direct examination as in the defense attorney’s crossexamination, because prosecutors are less likely to evince
deliberate attempts to change the child’s report. Similarly, the
challenges to children’s credibility assessed in this research are
typically overt—questioners directly suggested to children that
their reports were in error. However, practice guides routinely
suggest to defense attorneys that they undermine children’s
reports through implying external sources of influence, rather
than through overt challenges.22
17. See Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and Imagination: Lying,
Hypothetical Reasoning, and Referential Ambiguity, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMAGINATION 126 (Marjorie Taylor ed.,
2013) (questions difficult for children could be objected to as “vague” or
“ambiguous”), available at http://works.bepress.com/thomaslyon/77/; CAL.
EVID. CODE § 765(b) (2004) (questions asked of children under ten years of
age must be age-appropriate).
18. See Evans et al., supra note 12, at 262; Hanna, supra note 12, at 541,
Table 4 (defense attorneys tended to ask more complex questions than
prosecutors, but the differences were statistically significant in only one
comparison).
19. See generally Stacia Stolzenberg & Thomas Lyon, How Attorneys
Question Children about the Dynamics of Sexual Abuse and Disclosure in
Criminal Trials, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 19 (2014).
20. See MICHAEL E. LAMB, IRIT HERSHKOWITZ, YAEL ORBACH & PHILLIP W.
ESPLIN, TELL ME WHAT HAPPENED: STRUCTURED INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF
CHILD VICTIMS AND WITNESSES 40 (Graham Davies & Ray Bull eds., 2008).
21. See Perry et al., supra note 13, at 618–19; Carter et al., supra note
13, at 337, 349.
22. See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, Taint Hearings for Child Witnesses? A
Step in the Wrong Direction, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 873, 944–45 (1994); John E.B.
Myers, Examining the Young Witness: Paint the Child into Your Corner, 10
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In this paper we discuss a research program created to better
understand the difficulties that child witnesses encounter when
testifying about sexual abuse. We focus on a specific concern:
children’s memory for conversations about sexual abuse. This
problem is often overlooked but likely to be extremely important
in child sexual abuse trials, because both prosecutors and defense
attorneys see adult influence as a major factor in understanding
children’s allegations of sexual abuse. From a prosecutor’s
perspective, it is important to educate the jury about the suspect’s
ability to influence the child, both to acquiesce to sexual abuse and
to remain silent about the abuse. From a defense attorney’s
perspective, it is important to sensitize the jury to the risks that
interested parties have influenced the child’s report. Both
perspectives will make the child’s conversational interactions with
adults of central importance.
From a legal perspective, one might assume that children’s
conversations with others run afoul of the rule against hearsay.
However, as we will demonstrate, this is a misconception, both
because of the non-hearsay uses of out-of-court statements23 and
the numerous exceptions to the rule against hearsay.24 From a
psychological perspective, asking children about conversations
raises interesting and underexplored empirical issues. First, there
is little research on adults’ recall of conversations, let alone
research on children. Recall of conversations is likely to raise
difficulties in source monitoring (that is, the process by which one
recalls the source of information, such as where and when one
first learned some fact).25 Therefore, to the extent that children
are asked to recall specific conversations, their abilities may be
FAM. ADVOC. 41, 42–43, 48 (1988).
23. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2011).
24. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807 (2011).
25. See generally D. Stephen Lindsay, Marcia K. Johnson & Paul Kwon,
Developmental Changes in Memory Source Monitoring, 52 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 297, 314 (1991); Kim P. Roberts & Martine B. Powell,
Describing Individual Incidents of Sexual Abuse: A Review of Research on the
Effects of Multiple Sources of Information on Children’s Reports, 25 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1643, 1651–52 (2001); Maggie Bruck, Stephen J. Ceci, &
Emmet Francoeur, The Accuracy of Mothers’ Memories of Conversations With
Their Preschool Children, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 89, 103–04
(1999); Amye R. Warren & Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay
Testimony: How Well Do Interviewers Recall Their Interviews With Children,
5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L., 355, 365–66 (1999).
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taxed. Second, children may not understand the implications of
questions about conversations, and thus may be susceptible to
questions that imply subtly that the child was coached. Third, the
language that is used to ask children about conversations is likely
to provide difficulties. For example, whether a disclosure recipient
“asked” or “told” the child matters much to the case, but there is
evidence that the words are not well distinguished by young
children.26
In Section II, we describe how the hearsay rules allow for
questions about conversations in child sexual abuse cases. In
Section III, we discuss how prosecutors seeking to explain the
dynamics of sexual abuse to jurors should be motivated to ask
children questions about conversations with suspects, and we
describe the results of a study of court transcripts suggesting that
prosecutors are not making optimal use of this strategy.27 In
Section IV, we discuss how defense attorneys are likely to question
children about their conversations with others to whom they
disclosed their abuse (disclosure recipients) as a means of
suggesting adult influence. Again, we describe the results of a
court transcript study, and we find evidence that defense
attorneys are indeed pursuing this strategy.28 However, we also
show that prosecutors are also asking many questions about
conversations with disclosure recipients, and that both
prosecutors and defense attorneys often ask specific questions that
are likely very difficult for children to answer correctly.
Furthermore, we show that overt allegations of coaching or lying
by defense attorneys are infrequent, which suggests that their
attacks on children’s credibility are subtler. In Section V, we
discuss the linguistic difficulties presented by questions about
conversations and focus on children’s difficulty in distinguishing
between “ask” and “tell,” describing research we have conducted
examining
court
transcripts
and
assessing
children’s
understanding in the lab.29 Section VI concludes with
26. See Anne Graffam Walker, Handbook on Questioning Children: A
Linguistic Perspective, 2 ABA CENTER ON CHILD. & L. 1, 29 (1999).
27. See Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at 2, 18.
28. See id. at 7, 22.
29. The research we discuss, infra Section V(c), was recently presented
at the American Psychology and Law Society Annual Conference. See Stacia
N. Stolzenberg, Thomas D. Lyon, Christen Phillips, and Jennifer Mascia, She
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recommendations for legal practitioners and the courts in asking
child witnesses questions about conversations.
II. THE LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S CONVERSATIONS IN
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

At first glance, one might expect there to be little discussion of
conversations in child sexual abuse trials because of the rule
against hearsay. Informally, a hearsay problem arises whenever a
witness refers to what someone (including the witness) has said.
Technically, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.30 The law expects that cases be
proven through witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the
dispute at issue. When this occurs, those witnesses’ potential
infirmities—insincerity, misperception, memory failure, and
ambiguous narration—can be tested by the trial process.
Witnesses take the oath (which is intended to make them more
honest or sincere), and they are subject to direct- and crossexamination, by which their perception, memory, and narration
can be tested. When a witness quotes another person (an out-ofcourt declarant), the hearsay problem arises: the out-of-court
declarant is not under oath and cannot be cross-examined.31
Because of the rules against hearsay, one might assume that
the child witness will be asked to describe the abuse she suffered
and nothing more. However, many out-of-court statements are
not considered hearsay, because they are not “offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.”32 For example, when a plaintiff in a
slander case testifies that the defendant said, “You are a
scoundrel,” he is not offering the out-of-court statement to prove
its truth, and the statement would never be called hearsay.33 If
the statement is relevant simply because it was said (and
Told me, ‘What Happened?’” Young Children’s Misuse of the Verbs “Ask” and
“Tell” in the Lab and in Court, American Psychology and Law Society Annual
Conference, New Orleans, LA (2014).
30. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (2011); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1:2 (4th ed. 2009) (forty-two states have
adopted evidence codes based on the Federal Rules).
31. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 8:3. Technically, even
if the witness quotes herself, this is also hearsay, as long as the statement is
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
32. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
33. Id.
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regardless of its truth), then it is non-hearsay.34 Furthermore,
there are a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule.
In sexual abuse trials, many out-of-court statements will be
admissible despite the rule against hearsay. Although they fall
within the definition of hearsay, the prosecutor can offer any
statements by a criminal defendant as “an opposing party’s
statement.”35 Therefore, when the prosecutor calls the child to the
stand, any statement the child recalls hearing the suspect say is
admissible.36 The rationale is that the defendant is in court and is
free to explain any statements he may have made (i.e., he cannot
complain that he is unable to cross-examine himself).
Furthermore, many of the suspect’s statements, such as threats,
would not even be considered hearsay, since they are often offered
for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining the effects of the words
spoken on the child (e.g. compliance or secrecy).37 Therefore, the
prosecutor can ask a child about her interactions with the suspect
both before and after the alleged abuse, making it easy to elicit
reports of preparation before the abuse and efforts to keep the
abuse a secret. The suspect’s statements can also prove sexual
intent; for example, if the suspect has told the child to keep the
touching a secret, this makes it unlikely that the touching
constituted appropriate caretaking.38
A number of hearsay exceptions enable the prosecutor to
introduce disclosures of abuse by the child. These statements can
be elicited from the child or, more commonly, from anyone who
heard the child’s statement. One hearsay exception is for excited
utterances, which in the classic case involves a report of abuse
shortly after the abuse occurred and while the child is upset by
the abuse.39 The exception has been expansively interpreted so
that both the temporal requirement and the excitement

34.
35.
36.
37.

MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 8:18.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
See id.
See JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE OF INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE, CHILD MALTREATMENT, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, RAPE,
STALKING, AND ELDER ABUSE § 7.08 (2013).
38. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 11165.1 (West 1987) (stating that the
statutory definition of sexual abuse “does not include acts which may
reasonably be construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities”).
39. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); MYERS, supra note 37, § 7.13.
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requirement are relaxed in child abuse cases.40 Another hearsay
exception is for statements made for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment, which will cover many statements made
by the child to medical personnel, and to non-medical persons if
the child was motivated by a desire to receive care.41 This
exception has also been broadened, although its use for the child’s
identification of a perpetrator and for statements made to mental
health professionals is controversial.42 Finally, most states have
adopted special hearsay exceptions for children’s complaints of
abuse.43 These provisions vary, but common requirements limit
the statements to complaints of abuse by younger children
(typically pre-teens).44
If the child fails to testify altogether, concern for the
defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses will place
limits on the kinds of hearsay from the child that can be admitted;
if the child’s statements constituted “testimonial hearsay,” they
are inadmissible.45 “Testimonial hearsay” is still being defined,
but has been applied by many courts to formal questioning of the
child by law enforcement, by child protective services in many (if
not most) circumstances, and by forensic interviewers at child
advocacy centers.46 It is important to remember, however, that if
the child testifies, the constitutional objection to admissibility of
any hearsay from the child disappears.47
A number of hearsay exceptions (and non-hearsay use of
statements) apply to concerns about the consistency or
inconsistency of a child’s reports with the child’s testimony. A
child’s prior statements that are consistent with the child’s
40. Id.
41. FED. R. EVID. 803(4); MYERS, supra note 37, § 7.15.
42. Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disintegration of the
Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47–49 (2002).
43. See, e.g., THOMAS GARDNER & TERRY ANDERSON, EVIDENCE:
PRINCIPLES AND CASES 174 (7th ed. 2009); Glen Skoler, New Hearsay
Exceptions for a Child’s Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1
(1984).
44. NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 369–70 (3d ed. 2004).
45. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).
46. See Thomas D. Lyon & Julia Dente, Child Witnesses and the
Confrontation Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1183 (2012).
47. See id.
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testimony may be admissible under the prior consistent
statements hearsay exception.48 The exception typically requires,
however, that those statements in some way rebut a claim of
fabrication or influence, and they can do so by having occurred
prior to the time that something influenced the child to falsify her
story.49 For example, if the defense argues that the police’s
suggestive questioning influenced the child’s report, then the
child’s disclosure to a friend before the police were notified could
be admissible as a prior consistent statement. It is also possible
for prior consistent statements to be admitted as non-hearsay
rehabilitation. The rationale is that the consistency between the
prior statement and the child’s current testimony rebuts the
attack on the child’s testimony.50 For example, if the defense
suggests through cross-examination that the child does not recall
the original event, then the prosecutor could introduce the child’s
prior consistent statements (made closer in time to the event) to
argue that the consistency rebuts the attack on the child’s
memory.
Another hearsay exception applies to a child’s statements that
are inconsistent with that child’s testimony. Some states require
these prior statements to have been made under oath, which
would essentially limit them to preliminary hearing testimony.51
Furthermore, prior inconsistent statements can also be offered as
non-hearsay impeachment. The rationale is that the prior
statements are not offered for their truth, but to show that the
child makes inconsistent claims and therefore should not be
believed generally.52 The prosecution and defense will use prior
inconsistencies differently. The prosecution might seek to admit
prior inconsistent statements if a child recants some or all of her
disclosure on the stand. The defense is likely to use prior
inconsistencies to argue that the child is lying on the stand, or
that her story is the product of suggestion. The rationale is that a

48. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (2011).
49. Id.
50. See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (advisory committee
notes).
51. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (not
requiring that prior inconsistent statements have been under oath at a
proceeding).
52. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 8:17.
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child whose report is inconsistent over multiple disclosures is
unlikely to be true.
Because many statements made out of court can be admitted
under a hearsay exception or offered for a non-hearsay purpose, it
should not be surprising that children may be asked many
questions about conversations when they testify. However, it is
important to note that the conversations can be admitted through
any person who heard the statements.53 Therefore, although it
would probably be necessary to ask the child about many of the
suspect’s statements (because they would be made in private and
because the suspect would not admit having made them), the
child’s conversations with other adults could be elicited through
the adults’ testimonies rather than the child’s. Prosecutors
concerned with children’s limited memory and linguistic skills
might be inclined to avoid asking child witnesses questions about
specific aspects of their abuse disclosures, whereas defense
attorneys hoping to undermine children’s credibility might direct
most of their questions to the child. Therefore, one is likely to see
differences in the kinds of questions that prosecutors and defense
attorneys ask children about their prior conversations.
We recently completed the first study to examine how child
witnesses are questioned about their conversations. We reviewed
seventy-two transcripts of six- to sixteen-year-old child witnesses
testifying to child sexual abuse in Los Angeles County criminal
cases.54 We were interested in whether defense attorneys and
prosecutors did what a reading of the dynamics of sexual abuse
disclosures would suggest that they would do: Do prosecutors ask
questions focusing on conversations with suspects, in which
suspects cajole children into sexual acts and then threaten them
not to disclose? Do defense attorneys ask questions focusing on
prior disclosures as a means of identifying external influences on
children’s reports?

53.
54.

FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
See Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19.
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III. PROSECUTORS’ QUESTIONS ABOUT CHILDREN’S CONVERSATIONS
WITH SUSPECTS: EXPLAINING THE DYNAMICS OF SEXUAL ABUSE

A. The Relevance of Children’s Conversations from the
Prosecution’s Perspective
From the prosecutorial perspective, the unique dynamics of
sexual abuse—including abuse by an adult close to the child,
grooming behavior, and inducements to secrecy—lead children to
report abuse only reluctantly and often inconsistently.55
Prosecutors will often attempt to explain how the suspect
accomplished abuse without the use of force, because the jury may
envision abuse as akin to violent rape.56 It is also important to
explain why the victim kept the abuse a secret for a lengthy period
of time, because the jury may perceive delayed disclosure as
evidence that the allegation was fabricated.57 Although jurors
recognize that delayed disclosure is commonplace,58 they are more
likely to believe children when disclosure occurs soon after the
alleged abuse and when the child’s disclosure does not change over
time.59
Because of their pre-existing relationship with the child and
their grooming methods, perpetrators need not use force in order
to accomplish abuse or to guarantee the child’s silence. In most
sexual abuse cases, the suspect is familiar to the child, often a
close relative.60 The relationship gives the perpetrator access to
the child and allows the perpetrator to capitalize on the child’s
55.
See Jennifer Long, John Wilkinson & Julie Kays, 10 Strategies for
Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse at the Hands of a Family Member,
STRATEGIES: THE PROSECUTORS’ NEWSLETTER ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
Sept. 2011, at 2.
56.
KENNETH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
FOR PROFESSIONALS INVESTIGATING THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN
139 (5th ed. 2010).
57.
Long et al., supra note 55, at 2.
58.
See ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 164 (1993).
59.
See John A. Yozwiak, Jonathan M. Golding & D.F. Marsil, The
Impact of Type of Out-of-Court Disclosure in a Child Sexual Assault Trial, 9
CHILD MALTREATMENT 325, 330 (2004).
60. See Tina B. Goodman-Brown et al., Why Children Tell: A Model of
Children’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 525, 530
(2003); see also BARBARA E. SMITH & SHARON ELSTEIN, THE PROSECUTION OF
CHILD SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE 30–32 (1993).
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trust. The closeness of the relation increases the likelihood of
delay.61 Research that questions perpetrators about their modus
operandi reveals how perpetrators actively develop trust,
compliance, and silence.62 For example, Kaufman and colleagues
interviewed 228 perpetrators, who reported that over time they
would increasingly talk about sex, encourage children to wear less
clothing, and tell children that they would “teach them something”
before engaging in sexual acts.63 The progressive nature of the
abuse enabled perpetrators to assess the risk of disclosure before
the sexual behavior became overt, so that any disclosures could be
explained as innocent or misinterpreted.64 Once overt sexual acts
occurred, children would be deterred from disclosing because the
earlier acts made them feel as if they had consented and led them
to fear that they would be blamed for failing to complain.65
Perpetrators sometimes overtly threaten children not to
disclose the abuse. In 27–33% of criminal cases, children recalled
overt threats.66 According to Smith and Elstein,
[W]arnings ranged from pleas that the abuser would get
into trouble if the child told (or that the abuser would be
sent away and the child would never see them again—a
powerful message to a young child whose abuser is also a
‘beloved’ parent), to threats that the child would be
blamed for the abuse (especially troubling were children
who were told that the defendant’s intimate—the child’s
mother—would blame the child for ‘having sex’ with the
defendant and would thus turn against him or her), to
ominous warnings that the defendant would hurt or kill
61. LOUISE DEZWICK SAS & ALISON HATCH CUNNINGHAM, TIPPING THE
BALANCE TO TELL THE SECRET: THE PUBLIC DISCOVERY OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
24 (1995), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/
cornwall/en/hearings/exhibits/Peter_Jaffe/pdf/Tipping.pdf.
62. Benoit Leclerc, Jean Proulx & Eric Beauregard, Examining the
Modus Operandi of Sexual Offenders Against Children and its Practical
Implications, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 5 (2009).
63. Keith L. Kaufman et al., Factors Influencing Offenders’ Modus
Operandi: An Examination of Victim-Offender Relatedness and Age, 3 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 349, 353 (1998).
64. See Reuben A. Lang & Roy R. Frenzel, How Sex Offenders Lure
Children, 1 ANNALS OF SEX RESEARCH 303, 308 (1988).
65. See Kaufman et al., supra note 63, at 350–55.
66. See GRAY, supra note 58, at 90; SMITH & ELSTEIN supra note 60, at
93.
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the child (or someone he or she loved) if they revealed the
abuse.67
Perpetrators themselves have described how they discourage
children from disclosing.68 They emphasize the way in which
disclosure will lead the child to lose positive factors in the child’s
life, such as love, affection, friendship, and family stability.69 For
example, in a criminal sample of convicted offenders of child
sexual abuse, 33% of offenders specifically told their victims not to
tell and an additional 20% of offenders reported having threatened
loss of love or said the that child was to blame to maintain abuse
and discourage disclosure.70 Conte and colleagues similarly found
that perpetrators encouraged silence by telling victims that “their
friends wouldn’t like them anymore,” their mom might be mad, or
just by generally advising the child to “be careful not to tell
anyone.”71
The efficacy of perpetrators’ methods is demonstrated by
delays in disclosure. Criminal samples reveal that children
typically delay disclosure until multiple instances of abuse have
occurred, with one-third of children waiting at least a year.72 In
addition, children are capable of describing their reasons for
failing to disclose. Sas and Cunningham interviewed 135 children
after prosecution and found that the most common reasons for
delaying disclosure were: (a) fear of harm to self or others, (b) fear
of being rejected by a non-abusive caregiver, (c) concern for family
and thinking that non- or delaying disclosure might protect
family, (d) fear that their disclosure would not be believed, (e)
concern that bad consequences will harm the perpetrator, (f)
inability to trust anyone to disclose to, and (g) wanting to protect
67. SMITH & ELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 93.
68. See Michelle Elliot et al., Child Sexual Abuse Prevention: What
Offenders Tell Us, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 579, 586 (1995); see also
Stephen W. Smallbone & Richard K. Wortley, Child Sexual Abuse: Offender
Characteristics and Modus Operandi, AUSTL. INSTIT. OF CRIMINOLOGY:
TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIMINAL JUST., Feb. 2001, at 5.
69. See Lang & Frenzel, supra note 64, at 311–12; Smallbone & Wortley,
supra note 68, at 5; SMITH & ELSTEIN supra note 60, at 93.
70. See Elliott et al., supra note 68, at 582–86.
71. Jon R. Conte, Steven Wolf, & Tim Smith, What Sexual Offenders Tell
Us About Prevention Strategies, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 293, 297–98
(1989).
72. See SAS & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 61, at 27.
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other children, including siblings, from abuse.73
These findings suggest that, from the prosecutorial
perspective, much can be understood about the dynamics of abuse
by inquiring into what the suspect has said to the child, both to
reveal grooming and to uncover any admonishments against
disclosure.74 Furthermore, it is likely that the child will have
delayed disclosing the abuse, and it is worthwhile to explore the
reasons for that delay in order to help the jury understand.
Indeed, prosecutors are advised to explore the dynamics of
abuse,75 and the courts have been receptive to efforts to educate
juries about the reasons behind children’s delays and
inconsistencies.76
B. What Prosecutors Actually Do In Court
As we noted above, we reviewed the testimony of seventy-two
six- to sixteen-year-old child witnesses testifying to child sexual
abuse in Los Angeles County criminal cases.77 Initially, it is
worth noting that attorneys gave children little opportunity to
answer in their own words.78 Although the defense attorneys
were more inclined to ask overtly suggestive questions than
prosecutors, a majority of both prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’
questions could be answered simply “yes” or “no” (combining
across yes-no questions, declarative questions, and suggestive
questions).79 As a result, over 50% of children’s responses to
attorneys’ questions were in fact unelaborated yes and no
responses. Furthermore, children virtually never spontaneously
mentioned conversations; less than 1% of the question-answer
pairs that mentioned a conversation were spontaneous reports by
the children.80 Hence, children relied on the attorneys to develop
details about their conversations.
73. Id. at 27–28.
74. See id.
75. See Long et al., supra note 55, at 1–7.
76. See generally MYERS, supra note 37, § 6.18 (citing cases which hold
that expert testimony “is admissible to rehabilitate a child's credibility
following impeachment focused on delayed reporting, inconsistency, or
recantation”).
77. Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19.
78. See id. at 18.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Id.
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We found that children were asked about conversations with
suspects in virtually all (92%) of the trials.81 We classified
perpetrator statements to the child as pertaining to commands
during the abuse (i.e., giving the child instructions), seduction
(statements encouraging the child to engage in sexual activity),
silencing (attempts to keep the abuse a secret), and threats
(references to the negative consequences of disclosure). Not
surprisingly, prosecutors were more likely to ask about commands
and silencing than defense attorneys, and asked a larger number
of questions about all four categories of suspect statements.82 We
also analyzed children’s statements to the perpetrator, and
considered whether those statements were protesting abuse.83
Here, too, prosecutors were more likely than defense attorneys to
ask about children’s statements.84
However, prosecutors appeared to put more emphasis on the
coercive aspects of the abusive acts than on suspects’ seductive
preparation or efforts to keep the abuse a secret.85 Of those
prosecution questions that referenced either commands or
seduction, 75% referenced commands.86 Similarly, of prosecutors’
questions that asked about children’s statements, over 80%
referenced protests.87 Furthermore, whereas prosecutors asked
about perpetrator commands in a majority of the cases (71%), they
asked about seduction (38%), silencing (36%), or threats (15%) in
only a minority.88
Prosecutors were also disinclined to ask children why they
had disclosed or not disclosed abuse, asking each type of question
in less than a third (31%) of trials.89 This was particularly curious
because in 93% of the trials, child witnesses denied disclosing
some information (90% of cases by the prosecution, 83% by the
defense).90 On average, prosecutors elicited four denials per child,

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
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and defense attorneys seven.91 Hence, children were denying that
they had disclosed information, but they were only infrequently
asked to explain why.
The greater emphasis on coercion was surprising, given both
the emphasis on the seductive aspects of child molestation that is
stressed in the literature and on legal commentator’s advice to
prosecutors to emphasize the ways in which children
accommodate abuse.92 One possibility we considered was whether
the cases prosecuted are different than the cases discussed in the
literature. Indeed, there is evidence that prosecutors will weed
out cases that are most likely to involve seduction and silencing
rather than a single violent act of assault.93 Nevertheless,
children knew the suspect in 92% of the cases (and accused a
family member in 56%), and children in 70% of the cases alleged
multiple instances of abuse.94 Force was charged in only 10% of
the cases.95 These case characteristics strongly suggest that
seduction and silencing played a significant role in accomplishing
repeated abuse.
This raises additional explanations for prosecutors’ emphasis
on coercion. Prosecutors may be unaware of the manipulative
aspects of abuse. Protocols for interviewing children focus on
eliciting details about abuse96 and do not provide
recommendations regarding questions about the behavior of the
suspect with the child before abuse was initiated. Therefore,
prosecutors might receive cases without any information that
would assist them in understanding the process by which the
perpetrator molested the child over time. Prosecutors might
deliberately avoid questioning children about the seductive
aspects of abuse, because of concerns regarding how juries would
interpret such testimony. Jurors may view molestation cases with
seductive elements as less serious. One study found that male
mock jurors inquired into possible consent in cases involving
children as young as twelve years of age.97
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
Child:

Id. at 19.
Id.
See GRAY, supra note 58, at 114.
Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at 19–20.
Id. at 10.
LAMB ET AL., supra note 22.
Peter K. Isquith, Murray Levine & Janine Scheiner, Blaming the
Attribution of Responsibility to Victims of Child Sexual Abuse, in
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We think it is likely that prosecutors are missing an
opportunity to help jurors understand the dynamics of sexual
abuse when they fail to inquire into the child’s relationship with
the suspect before the abuse began and the ways in which the
suspect maintained the child’s acquiescence to abuse over time. If
the prosecutor doesn’t ask, then jurors may be puzzled by the
child’s reports of repeated abuse without any indication of outcry
or resistance. It seems particularly wrongheaded to fail to ask
children for their reasons for disclosing and for delaying
disclosure, because research has shown that children are capable
of explaining their disclosure decisions.98 Since, as noted above,
courts have been friendly toward expert testimony that explains to
jurors why children delay disclosing,99 it seems sensible to ask
children directly for their reasons.
In our study examining seventy-two cases, we were not able to
show that the kinds of questions prosecutors asked mattered to
the verdict (though there was a hint: juries were marginally more
likely to convict if the prosecution asked questions about motives
for non-disclosure).100 However, in a larger sample, we found
evidence that the common dynamics of sexual abuse made it more
difficult to obtain a conviction: jurors were much less likely to
convict if force was not charged and if there was evidence that the
child maintained contact with the suspect after the abuse
allegedly occurred.101 This suggests that prosecutors should
attempt to teach jurors that child sexual abuse is less like violent
rape and more like ongoing and subtle manipulation.

CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES 203, 222–23 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L.
Bottoms eds., 1993).
98. See, e.g., SAS & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 61, at 27.
99. See MYERS, supra note 37, at § 6.18 (citing cases which hold that
expert testimony “is admissible to rehabilitate a child's credibility following
impeachment focused on delayed reporting, inconsistency, or recantation”).
100. Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at 25.
101. See Stolzenberg & Lyon, Evidence Summarized, supra note 8.
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IV. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS’ QUESTIONS ABOUT CHILDREN’S
CONVERSATIONS WITH DISCLOSURE RECIPIENTS: EXPLAINING THE
DYNAMICS OF SEXUAL ABUSE DISCLOSURE

A. The Relevance of Children’s Conversations from the Defense
Perspective
When children first disclose abuse, a chain of events is set
into motion, including multiple formal and informal conversations
with family members, medical professionals, and legal authorities.
For those whose cases make it to criminal trials, children will
have reported their abuse numerous times to various recipients
over a lengthy period of time. These factors present unique
concerns regarding children’s ability to recall prior disclosure
conversations. One study found that sexually abused children
received on average four formal interviews (e.g., with law
enforcement, Department of Child and Family Services/social
workers, medical or mental health professionals, and school
personnel) and two informal interviews (e.g., with caregivers and
relatives) in the course of dependency court proceedings.102 It is
likely that children in criminal court proceedings experience still
more interviews because of the longer delays before trial in
criminal cases. These contacts provide a basis for the defense to
claim that the child’s report is the product of external influence.
From the defense perspective, children are vulnerable to
suggestion, and the fact that they have typically been questioned
about abuse several times before trial makes it difficult to elicit
the truth, as these pre-trial interviews and conversations may
have altered the child’s report.103 The defense will often argue
that the alleged victim is making a false report and will likely
explore how others have exerted influence over the child, leading
the child either to lie or to believe falsely that abuse occurred.
Caregivers (and others close to the child) may be motivated to
coach the child, and both caregivers and investigators may have
strong suspicions of abuse that they communicate through
102.
Lindsay C. Malloy, Thomas D. Lyon & Jodi A. Quas, Filial
Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse Allegations, 46 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD ADOLEC. PSYCHIATRY 162, 165 (2007).
103.
Kathleen B. Stilling, Developing the Defense in Child Sexual Assault
Cases, 16 THE WISCONSIN DEFENDER 1, 4–5 (2008), available at
http://www.buting.com/KBS-Wis-SPD-Article.pdf.
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suggestive questioning. Commentators have stressed that when
the suspect is an ex-spouse or ex-partner of a concerned adult,
that adult may be the source of the child’s report.104 Although
jurors understand that children, particularly young children, are
susceptible to suggestion,105 they may not be adequately sensitive
to the suggestiveness of different types of questioning.
The research on children’s suggestibility is vast, and
comprehensive reviews are available.106
Research has
documented a number of ways in which children, particularly
young children, can be led to make false reports: selective
reinforcement of the desired response;107 guided visualization of
the fictitious event;108 negative stereotyping of the suspect;109 and
repeated suggestions from parents.110 There is also a fair amount
104.
Nicholas M.C. Bala, Mindy Mitnick, Nico Trocme & Claire Huston,
Sexual Abuse Allegations and Parental Separtion: Smokescreen or Fire? 13 J.
FAM. STUD. 26, 28–29, available at https://secureweb.mcgill.ca/crcf/sites
/mcgill.ca.crcf/files/2007Sexual_Abus_Allegations_Parental_Separation.pdf;
see also David P.H. Jones & J. Melbourne McGraw, Reliable and Fictitious
Accounts of Sexual Abuse to Children, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 27, 30
(1987).
105.
Jodi A. Quas, William C. Thompson & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, Do
Jurors “Know” What Isn’t So About Child Witnesses?, 29 L. & HUMAN BEHAV.
425, 440 (2005).
106.
Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, The Suggestibility of Children’s
Memory, 50 ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 419, 434–36 (1999), available at
http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~doneill/cogsci600/Kenyon.pdf; see also Gail S.
Goodman & Annika Melinder, Child Witness Research and Forensic
Interviews of Young Children: A Review, 12 THE BRIT. PSYCHOL. SOC’Y 1, 9–10
(2007).
107.
Sena Garven, Majes M. Wood, Roy S. Malpass & John S. Shaw,
More Than Suggestion, The Effect of Interviewing Techniques from the
McMartin Preschool Case, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 354 (1998); see also
Sena Garven, James M. Wood & Roy S. Malpass, Allegations of Wrongdoing,
The Effects of Reinforcement on Children’s Mundane and Fantastic Claims,
85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 38, 45 (2000).
108.
Stephen J. Ceci, Elizabeth F. Loftus, Michelle D. Leichtman &
Maggie Bruck, The Possible Role of Source Misattributions in the Creation of
False Beliefs Among Preschoolers, 42 INT’L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 304, 315 (1994), available at http://www.shoreline.edu/dchris
/psych209/Documents/Ceci%20and%20 Loftus.pdf.
109.
Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of Stereotypes
and Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568,
572 (1995), available at http://www.psy.cmu.edu/~rakison/leichtman.pdf.
110.
Debra Ann Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Children’s Eyewitness
Reports After Exposure to Misinformation from Parents, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 129, 147 (1995); see also Debra Ann Poole & D. Stephen
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of research demonstrating children’s susceptibility to explicit
coaching to make false claims.111
For the defense, it should be of interest to determine what
disclosure recipients have said to the child. This may reveal
biases of the recipients and sources of influence. Furthermore, the
defense is likely to question the child about different disclosures,
including: the initial disclosure, typically to a caregiver or a
teacher; formal disclosures to law enforcement and social services;
and disclosures to the prosecuting attorney, in order to attempt to
show that the child’s abuse report evolved over time. Indeed,
practice guides provide this advice to defense attorneys
representing child sexual abuse suspects,112 and the courts have
been receptive to defense claims of child suggestibility.113
B. What Defense Attorneys Actually Do in Court
In the study we described above, in which we examined the
courtroom testimony of seventy-two six- to sixteen-year-old
children in child sexual abuse criminal trials, we found that
children were asked questions about their disclosures of abuse in
all cases.114 First, we examined when and how often children
were asked about specific recipients. Virtually all (88%) of the
questions were about specific recipients, and most of these
involved disclosures to the child’s mother or a police officer.115 On
average, children were asked about five different recipients.116
Defense attorneys were more likely than prosecutors to ask about
specific recipients, but 85% of prosecutors’ questions were
nevertheless specific.117 Defense attorneys also asked about more
recipients on average than prosecutors, but even prosecutors
Lindsay, Children’s Eyewitness Reports After Exposure to Misinformation
From Parents, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 27, 49 (2001).
111.
Thomas D. Lyon, Lindsay C. Malloy, Jodi A. Quas & Victoria A.
Talwar, Coaching, Truth Induction, and Young Maltreated Children’s False
Allegations and False Denials, 79 CHILD DEV. 914, 927–28 (2008); see also
Jodi A. Quas, Elizabeth L. Davis, Gail S. Goodman & John E. B. Meyers,
Repeated Questions, Deception, and Children’s True and False Reports of
Body Touch, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 60, 64–65 (2007).
112. Stilling, supra note 103, at 4–5.
113. Myers, supra note 22, at 944–45.
114. Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at 2, 10.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id.
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asked about an average of three different disclosure recipients.118
We then examined specifically how attorneys’ questions
referenced disclosure content and individual disclosure
conversations. We found that most of the questions were general
(i.e., they referred to disclosing abuse generally), but nevertheless
in 80% of the trials children were asked at least one question
about specific content, and prosecutors and defense attorneys were
equally likely to do so.119 Similarly, in 80% of the trials children
were asked about a specific disclosure conversation, and, again,
prosecutors and defense attorneys were equally likely to ask these
types of questions.120
Defense attorneys differed from prosecutors in a couple of
respects. They asked more questions about specific content, and
more questions in which they referenced both specific content and
a specific conversation.121 Indeed, they were twice as likely as
prosecutors to ask about specific content within a specific
conversation (e.g., “Did you tell [your father] when he came into
your room at Thanksgiving, that the suspect dragged you out of
your room?”), asking this type of question in 60% of the trials.122
The fact that child witnesses were asked a large number of
specific questions about their prior disclosures calls into question
children’s abilities to remember what they previously discussed.
Compounding the problem is that there are routinely substantial
delays between children’s disclosures and their trial testimony;123
the average delay in the present sample was eight months
between charges being filed and the start of the trial.
There are several respects in which children’s memory for
conversations is likely to be limited. First, when children are
asked about specific disclosure recipients, details, and disclosure
conversations, they may exhibit some confusion regarding what
was said to whom and when. Distinguishing among different
118. Id.
119. Id. at 5–6.
120. Id. at 5.
121. Id. at 5–6.
122. Id. at 6.
123. Gail S. Goodman, Elizabeth Pyle Taub, David P.H. Jones, Patricia
England, Linda K. Port, Leslie Rudy & Lydia Prado, Testifying in Criminal
Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS
SOC’Y RES. CHILD DEV. 1, 19 (1992); see also ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 93
(1993).
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conversations requires source monitoring, which exhibits large
developmental changes.124 Because children have multiple
disclosure conversations, questions about individual conversations
present difficulties analogous to those encountered by children
when attempting to recall a single instance of a repeated event.125
Second, children may have difficulty in distinguishing
between what they said and what their conversational partner
said, another type of source monitoring. Research examining
adults’ ability to remember their conversations with children has
found that adults have difficulty recalling how information was
elicited, whether statements were spontaneous or prompted, and
who uttered specific utterances.126 We are not aware of any
research examining children’s abilities to identify the speaker in
prior conversations. Third, children may confuse what they
thought about disclosing with what they actually disclosed, a type
of reality monitoring.127
The prosecutors’ rationale for asking specific questions about
prior disclosures is unclear. As we discussed above, the child’s
disclosures to others may be admissible hearsay corroborating
abuse, but if so, it is equally permissible to elicit information
about the disclosure from adult recipients as from the child him or
herself. By eliciting the information from the child (rather than
the adult recipients), the prosecutor increases the risk that the
child will be subject to difficult questions about the specifics of
each disclosure, inconsistencies across the disclosures, and
implications of coaching and influence that the child witness may

124.
D. Stephen Lindsay, Marcia K. Johnson & Paul Kwon,
Developmental Changes in Memory Source Monitoring, 52 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 297, 314 (1991).
125.
Kim P. Roberts, Martine B. Powell, Describing Individual Incidents
of Sexual Abuse: A Review of Research on the Effects of Multiple Sources of
Information on Children’s Reports, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1643, 1651–52
(2001).
126.
Maggie Bruck, Emmett Francoeur & Stephen J. Ceci, The Accuracy
of Mothers’ Memories of Conversations with their Preschool Children, 5 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 89, 103 (1999); see also Amye R. Warren &
Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: How Well Do
Interviewers Recall their Interviews with Children?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
LAW 355, 365–66 (1999).
127. Mary Ann Foley, Marcia K. Johnson & Carol L. Raye, Age-Related
Changes in Confusion Between Memories for Thoughts and Memories for
Speech, 54 CHILD DEV. 51, 58 (1983).
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be ill-equipped to rebut.
C. Overt vs. Subtle Allegations of Influence by the Disclosure
Recipient
In some foreign jurisdictions, defense attorneys are expected
to directly state their position to the prosecuting witness in crossexamination.128 Zajac and her colleagues have shown in a series
of studies that children (and adults) will often change their stories
if they are directly challenged by cross-examination.129 In our
study of court transcripts, in contrast, we found that defense
attorneys overtly asked the child whether others had influenced
the story in only 21% of the cases (prosecutors did so in 26%).130
The lack of overt accusations raises a different potential problem;
attorneys may be attempting to discredit children in subtle ways.
Indeed, practice guides have suggested that attorneys should
merely imply that the child witness is lying or that the child’s
story is the product of influence.131
Adult witnesses are likely to understand a number of aspects
of the trial process. First, they understand that when they testify,
the jury or the judge will be assessing their credibility. Second,
they recognize that the job of the attorney who called them to the
stand is to support their credibility (unless they are called as a
hostile witness), and that the job of the cross-examiner is to
undermine their credibility. Third, they likely recognize that the
cross-examiner will challenge their credibility indirectly. They
will listen carefully to each question in order to assess where the
questions might lead, and to recognize what the cross-examiner is
implying. Nevertheless, adult witnesses are likely to frequently
succumb to clever cross-examiners.132 In turn, child witnesses are
128. Hanna, supra note 12, at 541.
129. Zajac et al., Asked and Answered, supra note 12, at 206; Zajac &
Hayne, I Don’t Think That is Really What Happened, supra note 16, at 191–
93; Zajac & Hayne, The Negative Effect of Cross-Examination, supra note 11,
at 9.
130. Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at Table 3.
131. John E.B. Myers, Paint the Child into Your Corner, 10 FAM. AVOC.
41, 43 (1987–1988).
132. FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION (1903),
available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/40781/40781-h/40781-h.htm#Page
_23 (“If . . . the counsel's manner is courteous and conciliatory, the witness
will soon lose the fear all witnesses have of the cross-examiner, and can
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almost surely more susceptible.
There are a number of ways in which defense attorneys could
subtly suggest that children’s reports are the product of adult
influence. Simply asking a child about the number of people who
have spoken to the child about abuse implies influence. Similarly,
asking the child about any treats, toys, or games involving
disclosure recipients suggests contingent reinforcement. Asking
whether various interviewers “helped” the child remember can
take advantage of the child’s positive view of both adult authority
figures (including parents, teachers, and police officers) and the
virtues of adult assistance.
For example, in one California case,133 the defense attorney
asked the twelve-year-old child witness about the prosecutor’s
preparatory interview: “Did Mr. Zuniga remind you what you had
told the police officer earlier?”134 The child answered “yes.”135 The
judge interceded (a rare occurrence), and said: “Wait, just a
second. Did Mr. Zuniga go over any report or did he tell you what
happened or did you tell him what happened?”136 The child
responded, “I told him what happened.”137 The judge recognized
the implication of the defense attorney’s question, that the
prosecutor had coached the child.138 The judge’s question, in turn,
allowed the child to respond in such a way that nothing negative
was implied. Indeed, the judge’s question could be criticized
because it assumed that the choices (the interviewer reminded the
child and the child told the interviewer) were mutually exclusive.
The extent to which the child understood the purpose of either the
defense attorney or the judge’s question is unclear.
The extent to which children understand strategic crossexamination is a promising area for future developmental
research. In addition to the aspects of the witness role that adults
are likely to understand, noted above, other relevant concepts are
almost imperceptibly be induced to enter into a discussion of his testimony in
a fair-minded spirit, which, if the cross-examiner is clever, will soon disclose
the weak points in the testimony.”).
133. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, People v. Cedillos, No. 131880
(Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1998) (on file with author).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id..
137. Id.
138. See id.
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also likely to undergo substantial change throughout the preschool
and elementary school years. First, to what extent do children
understand that the biases of a questioner and the types of
questions that are asked influence reports and can ultimately
taint memory?139 Second, when do children understand the
process by which one person determines whether another person
is telling the truth, as opposed to succumbing to the pressures of a
questioner?140 A child with these types of understanding can
appreciate that when a cross-examiner elicits the fact that a
disclosure recipient believed that abuse occurred, or asked
questions suggesting that abuse occurred, a jury is less likely to
believe the child.
A third important question concerns children’s ability to
understand cross-examiners’ questions that are designed to imply
one thing to the witness and another thing to the fact-finder.
Consider the attorney’s question “did the nice policeman help you
remember?”
Young children are likely to have a positive
perception of policemen and of how they can help. They are
unlikely to recognize the possibility that the attorney can be
implying something quite different, such as insinuating that the
policeman was not so nice and not so helpful. Children can
respond to implied messages at a very young age, in particular
indirect requests (e.g., “can you pass the salt?”).141 However,
139. Kamala London, Maggie Bruck, Debra Ann Poole & Laura Melnyk,
The Development of Metasuggestibility in Children, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 146, 151 (2011); see also Michael Siegal, Lorraine J. Waters &
Leigh Simon Dinwiddy, Misleading Children: Causal Attributions for
Inconsistency Under Repeated Questioning, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 438, 453 (1988).
140. This kind of research is analogous to research examining children’s
appreciation of the process by which lies are detected, such as a study in
which children understood that eye gaze aversion is believed to be
inconsistent with sincerity. Alejo Freire, Michelle Eskritt & Kang Lee, Are
Eyes Windows to a Deceiver’s Soul? Children’s Use of Another’s Eye Gaze Cues
in a Deceptive Situation, 40 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1093, 1098 (2004); see also
Anjanie McCarthy & Kang Lee, Children’s Knowledge of Deceptive Gaze Cues
and its Relation to their Actual Lying Behavior, 103 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 117, 114 (2009).
141. Marilyn Shatz, On the Development of Communicative
Understandings: An Early Strategy for Interpreting and Responding to
Messages, 10 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 271, 294 (1978); see also Marylyn Shatz,
Children’s Comprehensions of their Mothers’ Question-Directives, 5 J. CHILD
LANGUAGE 39, 45 (1977).
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children’s conscious recognition of the distinction between literal
meaning and implied meaning develops over time.142 A related
line of research concerns children’s understanding of referential
ambiguity, and shows that if an interpretation of an ambiguous
statement is readily available, young children will latch onto that
interpretation and fail to recognize the ambiguity of the
statement, let alone recognize a secondary interpretation.143

V.

LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY QUESTIONS ABOUT
CONVERSATIONS: ASK VS. TELL

Even if attorneys could be compelled to ask facially simple
questions, children’s limited language skills could still lead to
misunderstanding. In the context of conversations, one potential
for confusion concerns the verbs that we use to describe different
kinds of statements. In this section, we will focus on the words
“ask” and “tell.” When one is seeking information, one “asks,” and
when one provides information, one “tells.” When one is seeking
permission, one “asks,” and when one commands, one “tells.”
Children’s understanding of these distinctions can affect how they
talk about their disclosures of abuse and their interactions with
suspects.
A. Did Your Mother Ask You or Tell You What Happened?
In California v. Ortega, a case tried in Los Angeles County,
the defense attorney argued that the five-year-old child’s abuse
allegations against her uncle were the result of coaching by the
child’s mother.144 On cross-examination of the forensic
interviewer, he asked: “Now, if . . . the child says to you that
someone told me to say that I was touching that person, you know,
142. Carol R. Beal & John H. Flavell, Development of the Ability to
Distinguish Communicative Intention and Literal Message Meaning, 55
CHILD DEV. 920, 927 (1984); see also Gary Bonitatibus, Comprehension
Monitoring and the Apprehension of Literal Meaning, 59 CHILD DEV. 60, 68
(1988).
143. Beal & Flavell, supra note 142, at 926–27; see also Elizabeth S.
Nilsen & Susan A. Graham, The Development of Preschoolers’ Appreciation of
Communicative Ambiguity, 83 CHILD DEV. 1400, 1411 (2012).
144. Reporters’ Partial Trial Transcript at 32, People v. Ortega, No.
PA064937-01 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 16–17, 2010) (on file with author).
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that he was touching my private parts, a number of times,
wouldn’t you follow up on that?”145 The attorney was referring to
several points during the interview when the child appeared to
disclose that the mother had told her that she had been abused.
For example, the child reported that after the alleged abuse
occurred, “And then we get home and my mom says, ‘Come here.’
And we go to our room and she tells me all what happened when
he was touching my private parts.”
Fortunately for the
prosecution, the interviewer had followed up. She asked “what do
you mean that your mom told you all what happened” and “what
exactly did your mom say to you?” The child explained: “She said,
“What happened?” And I said, “My uncle was touching my private
parts and it hurt.”146 The case hints that the child was simply
confusing the words “ask” and “tell”—she should have said “she
asks me all what happened” instead of “she tells me all what
happened”—which highlights the significance of simple linguistic
confusion in understanding children’s testimony.147
Unlike many of the developmental questions discussed thus
far in this paper, there is a surprisingly large literature on
children’s ability to distinguish between the words “ask” and “tell,”
most of it inspired by work on grammatical development
conducted by Carol Chomsky in the late 1960s.148 Furthermore,
Anne Graffam Walker, a forensic linguist, brought the potential
difficulties to the attention of legal professionals through
groundbreaking writings that introduced lawyers to linguistic

145. Id. at 37.
146. See Transcript of Forensic Interview, People v. Ortega (Cal. Super.
Ct. July 1, 2009) (No. PA064937-01).
147. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial, People v. Lomeli (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 9,
1998) (No. 126866) (Jessica, a ten-year-old, stated: “first my mom called the
police station, and then they came to our house, and they told me ‘what he
did’”); see also Transcript of Trial, People v. Vasquez, No. 148877 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Feb. 5, 2001) (Natalie, an eight-year-old was interviewed by the defense
attorney: “Q: Okay. And what did he do with the pencil, anything? A: He
just like put it like on top and then put it inside and then he just told me if he
put it on top or inside.”). In Vasquez, however, the defense attorney pushed
his luck, and followed up with: “So he was telling you what had happened; is
that right?” At this point, the child recognized the negative implication, and
responded “No. He was asking me if he put it inside or me or on top of me
and was using the pencil to pretend that’s his private part.” Id.
148. See generally CAROL CHOMSKY, THE ACQUISITION OF SYNTAX IN
CHILDREN FROM 5 TO 10 (1969).
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development.149 Specifically, Walker warned that “the meaning
difference” for ask/tell “is often not sorted out by children until
they are anywhere from 7 to 10.”150
However, perusal of the ask/tell research highlights the
potential difficulties in applying research in language
development to children’s testimony. First, Chomsky’s findings
sparked a great deal of research in large part because many
researchers challenged her conclusions. Second, Chomsky was
primarily interested in how specific grammatical forms could be
misconstrued by children, rather than how well children
understand the words “ask” and “tell” more generally.151 That is,
Chomsky’s findings highlighted the fact that whether children
appear to understand “ask” and “tell” can be highly contextdependent.152 Hence, in applying the research on ask/tell to
children’s testimony, it is useful to consider how attorneys use the
words, and how children understand those specific uses.
Chomsky tested how children responded when told to “ask” or
“tell” another child.153 She found confusion in response to a
specific type of sentence among children up to ten years of age,
and confusion across sentences among children up to six years of
age.154 Chomsky found that children had the greatest difficulty in
distinguishing between “ask” and “tell” in sentences such as
“ask/tell Laura what to feed the doll.”155
These sentences
combined wh- clauses (e.g. “what. . .”), complement verbs (e.g. “to
feed”), and missing subjects (i.e., the sentence does not specify who
should feed the doll). Note that if one “tells” Laura what to feed
the doll, then Laura should do the feeding, but if one “asks” Laura
what to feed the doll, then one should do the feeding. However, in
both ask and tell versions of the sentence, children assumed that
Laura was the person who should feed the doll.156 This difficulty
persisted among even the oldest children Chomsky tested (tenyear-olds) and she noted anecdotally that these sentences were
149. Ann Graffam Walker, Handbook on Questioning Children: A
Linguistic Perspective, 2 ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 29 (1999).
150. Id.
151. See generally CHOMSKY, supra note 148.
152. See generally id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See generally id. at 101.
156. Id.
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even difficult for adults.157 Other sentences, however, were
problematic only for the five- and six-year-olds, such as “ask/tell
Laura what this is” (wh- clause, subject supplied) or “ask/tell
Laura your last name” (noun phrase).158 The younger children
always responded by telling rather than asking.159
Subsequent work criticized Chomsky’s findings. Both Warden
and Tanz argued that children ignore the exact wording used by
experimenters and instead attempt to infer what the experimenter
wants; in other words, they interpret the statements
pragmatically.160 Warden found that four- to five-year-olds
responded to both “ask” and “tell” sentences as if they should
ask.161 Hence, when told to “tell [the other child] your last name,”
children asked the other child “what is my last name?”162 Warden
argued that children assumed that the purpose of the game was to
engage the other child in a conversation, and questions operated
to spark the other child’s interest.163 Hence, whether they were
told to ask or tell, they asked. Warden argued that the pragmatics
of Chomsky’s task led children to assume that the adult wanted
them to tell the other child what that child should do with the
doll.164 Similarly, Tanz showed that five- to nine-year-old children
interpreted “ask” sentences about the rules of a game (e.g. “ask
Rachel where to put the red cards”) in light of their knowledge or
ignorance; if they were ignorant of the rules of the game, they
asked, but when they knew the rules of the game, they told.165
Importantly, these studies did not deny that children had
difficulty in responding correctly to statements using “ask” and
“tell,” but rather they disagreed with Chomsky regarding the
reasons for children’s difficulty.166 Chomsky argued the difficulty

157. Id.
158. Id. at 45.
159. See id.
160. See Christine Tanz, Asking Children to Ask; An Experimental
Investigation of the Pragmatics of Relayed Questions, 10 J. CHILD LANGUAGE
187, 193–94 (1983); David Warden, Children’s Understanding of Ask and
Tell, 8 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 139,145 (1981).
161. Warden, supra note 160, at 143–44.
162. See id. at 145.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Tanz, supra note 160, at 192.
166. Id. at 190; Warden, supra note 160, at 144.
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was attributable to grammar, whereas Warden and Tanz argued
the difficulty was due to pragmatics.167 For our purposes,
however, the studies failed to resolve an important question: is it
possible to focus children’s attention on the words themselves
(rather than their pragmatic assumptions about our questions),
and, if one does so, do they understand the distinction between
telling and asking?
Both Chomsky and Warden devised picture tasks in order to
avoid children’s pragmatic assumptions about how to respond to
instructions, but their interpretation of the results only led to
more questions.168 Chomsky found that children’s difficulties
were reduced, but not eliminated (and a replication by Kessel
found the same thing).169 Warden argued that his tasks showed
good understanding among four- and five-year-olds, but Chomsky
pointed out two problems with Warden’s tasks that likely
exaggerated children’s apparent comprehension.170
167. See CHOMSKY, supra note 148, at 101–02; Tanz, supra note 160, at
192–93; Warden, supra note 160, at 148–49.
168. See CHOMSKY, supra note 148, at 100; Warden, supra note 160, at
146.
169. CHOMSKY, supra note 148, at 99–101; Frank S. Kessel, The Role of
Syntax in Children’s Comprehension from Ages Six to Twelve, 35
MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD DEV. 1, 34–35 (1970).
170. Warden, supra note 160, at 147; Carol Chomsky, ‘Ask’ and Tell’
Revisited: A Reply to Warden, 9 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 667, 667 (1981)
[hereinafter Chomsky, A Reply to Warden]. Both researchers showed
children pictures, read them sentences, and asked them questions about the
pictures. Chomsky found that the difficulties of children in grades one to
three were reduced, but not eliminated, when they were presented with pairs
of pictures and asked to identify which picture matched an ask sentence (e.g.
“the boy asks the girl what to wear,” comparing pictures in which the boy or
the girl is trying on shoes). CHOMSKY, supra note 148, at 99, 101. Chomsky
found that five- to seven-year-olds had difficulty when they were presented
with single pictures, told “[name 1] asked [name 2] wh- with non-specific
subject,” (e.g., “Susan asks Mary which tree to climb”) and then asked “which
one is [name 1]” and “what is he saying?”). See Chomsky, A Reply to Warden,
supra, at 675–76. Warden found that four- to five-year-olds were 90%
accurate when presented with single pictures, told “[name 1] asked/told
[name 2] wh-“(e.g., “Bill is asking/telling Gordon where the cat has gone”),
and asked “which is [name 1]/[name2]?” Warden, supra note 160, at 147.
Chomsky, however, criticized Warden’s stories; they did not always involve
the more complicated wh- with non-specific subject construction, and children
were not asked what the chosen character actually said. Chomsky, A Reply
to Warden, supra, at 670. In her stories, children often chose the correct
character as the asker, but then quoted the character as telling. See id. at
670–71. Warden’s subsequent response criticized Chomsky’s picture method,
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In sum, although Walker warned legal professionals that
children do not understand the distinction between ask and tell
until seven to ten years of age, the literature does not provide
clear support for the contention that this misunderstanding will
manifest itself in testimony.171 Chomsky argued that seven-yearolds could handle most uses of “ask,” but had difficulty if
presented with sentences such as “ask Laura what to feed the
doll,” when the subject of “to feed” was unspecified.172 In contrast,
the distinction between “tell you what happened” and “ask you
what happened” need not present difficulties, because the
sentence does not contain a complement verb with an ambiguous
subject.173
Another difficulty with the literature is the potential
mismatch between the way in which children’s comprehension is
tested in the laboratory and the way in which children’s use might
be misunderstood in the legal setting. Clearly, children are not
provided with instructions to ask or tell in either forensic
interviews or in court; rather, they are asked to relate
conversations, during which they may spontaneously utter the
words “ask” and “tell,” and they will be asked questions that
contain the words ask and tell.
In the legal context, and as demonstrated by the opening
example, a child’s confusion between “asking” and “telling” could
affect his or her characterization of interactions with disclosure
recipients. In particular, the child’s characterization of the
disclosure recipient’s statements as “telling” rather than “asking”
would suggest that the recipient’s statements influenced the
child’s disclosure instead of inquiring about it—insinuating
coaching or suggestive influence instead of support and interest in
the child’s allegation. This suggestion could interfere with the
jurors’ understanding of the disclosure process, thus rendering it
more difficult to understand why the child disclosed abuse and
whether their allegation is credible. Therefore, a more definitive
means of assessing children’s understanding is needed to match
but acknowledged the potential difficulty of the wh- with non-specific subject
construction. David Warden, How to Tell if Children Can Ask, 13 J. CHILD
LANGUAGE 421, 423–26 (1986).
171. Walker, supra note 149, at 29.
172. See Chomsky, A Reply to Warden supra note 170, at 670.
173. See id.
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the questioning context that is used in the field.
A further complication concerns children’s use of the terms
“ask” and “tell” when Spanish is their first language. In addition
to the obvious difficulties of comprehending anything said in a
second language, there is potential for additional confusion among
Spanish-speaking children because “decir” can function as both
“said,” and “told.”174 Hence a Spanish fluent child learning to
speak English might use the word “tell” in place of “said.”
Specifically, the child who says, “My mother told me what
happened” may mean, “My mother said to me ‘what happened?’”
B. Did the Defendant Ask You or Tell You to Go with Him?
The debate between Chomsky and her critics raised an
important distinction between different uses of “ask” and “tell”
that were touched upon in the beginning of this section. Chomsky
noted that some children may have interpreted the instruction to
“ask” as “request politely.”175 In other words, children who were
told to “ask Laura what to feed the doll” heard “tell Laura what to
feed the doll in a nice way.”176 The distinction is that between
epistemic and deontic uses of words. “Ask” and “tell” can be used
both epistemically and deontically. We have been discussing the
terms in their epistemic sense: “ask” refers to questions seeking
information, and “tell” refers to providing information. “Ask” and
“tell” can also be used deontically: “ask” means to make a polite
request and “tell” means to command.
The epistemic/deontic distinction has been extensively
discussed with respect to other terms, such as “must.” One can
174. Carole Edelsky & Virginia Muiña, Native Spanish Language
Acquisition: The Effect of Age, Schooling and Context on Responses to ‘Dile’
and ‘Preguntale’, 4 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 453, 464 (1976) (“if the verb tell is
used . . . the embedded clause is ambiguous out of further context in ELA
[East Los Angeles Mexican Immigrant] English between a WH question and
a WH statement”); Benji Wald, Spanish-English Grammatical Contact in Los
Angeles: The Grammar of Reported Speech in the East Los Angeles English
Contact Vernacular, 25 LINGUISTICS 53, 65–66 (1987).
175. See Chomsky, A Reply to Warden supra note 170, at 677.
176. See id.; see also Kessel, supra note 169, at 8, 35–36 (some children
interpreted “ask” as a request); Walker, supra note 149, at 29 (arguing that
children’s difficulty in understanding ask and tell might lie in the fact that
ask can signify both a request and a polite command); Warden, supra note
160, at 423–24 (discussing the difference between the directive and
informative uses of “ask” and “tell”).
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use “must” to refer to necessity in light of knowledge (a parent
would say that the child “must” be in bed when she has searched
everywhere else for him); this is an epistemic use of the word.
One can also use “must” to refer to necessity in light of a command
(a parent would say that the child “must” be in bed when she has
ordered her to go); this is a deontic use. Generally speaking,
children tend to acquire the deontic meaning of words before they
acquire their epistemic meaning, perhaps because they
understand concepts of desire and interpersonal influence before
they understand belief and knowledge acquisition.177
Surprisingly, researchers have not compared children’s
deontic and epistemic understandings of “ask” and “tell.”
However, there is some evidence for early deontic understanding:
Bock and Hornsby instructed three- to six-year-olds either to “ask”
or to “tell” their partner (either an adult or child) to give them
pieces of a puzzle they needed to complete, and found that even
the youngest children more often used the word “please” and an
interrogative (e.g. “can I have the plate?”) if they were in the “ask”
condition.178
In the deontic context, a child’s confusion between “asking”
and “telling” could affect his or her characterization of interactions
with suspects and others. In particular, the child’s
characterization of the suspect’s statements as “telling” rather
than “asking” would suggest that the suspect’s statements were
designed to ensure that the child’s compliance were commands
rather than requests. This could interfere with the jurors’
understanding of the dynamics of abuse, thus rendering it more
difficult to understand why the child might continue to exhibit
affection toward the suspect after abuse had occurred. However,
unlike the research examining the epistemic uses of “ask” and
“tell,” there is little support in the literature for children’s deontic
confusion.

177. See
JAN
NYUTS,
EPISTEMIC MODALITY,
LANGUAGE,
AND
CONCEPTUALIZATION: A COGNITIVE-PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE 232 (2001).
178. J. Kathryn Bock & Mary E. Hornsby, The Development of Directives:
How Children Ask and Tell, 8 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 151, 153, 159 (1981).
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C. Research on “Ask” and “Tell” in a Legal Context179
In order to assess how confusion between “ask” and “tell”
might affect child witnesses, we first examined how attorneys and
child witnesses use the terms “ask” and “tell” in sexual abuse
trials. We analyzed one hundred cases of alleged sexual abuse
involving child witnesses ages twelve and under. We found over
2,500 question-answer pairs in which either the attorney or the
child (or both) used either “ask” or “tell.” We found that in 83% of
the cases, the use was ambiguous, in that one could grammatically
substitute “tell” for “ask” or “ask” for “tell,” so that if a child did
not distinguish between the terms, the statement could be
misinterpreted.180 Over 70% of attorneys’ questions were yes/no
questions, and children responded without elaboration over 75% of
the time. Children clarified whether they meant “ask” or “tell” in
3% of their answers. Further, attorneys clarified whether they
meant “ask” or “tell” in 4% of their follow-up questions. As a
result, ambiguous uses of the words would usually be followed by
a simple “yes” or “no” from the child without clarification of
whether the attorneys’ use of “ask” and “tell” matched that of the
child. Hence, if children did confuse the terms, it would be
impossible to discern the confusion most of the time that the
terms were used.
In our second study, we examined ninety-seven maltreated
eight- to eleven-year-olds’ abilities to correctly use the words “ask”
and “tell.”181 Children were read a series of interactions between
parents and children and then were asked about what was said.
In the scenarios, children and parents requested or gave
information, as well as requested or commanded actions. This
corresponds directly with both epistemic and deontic uses for “ask”
(epistemic: The Mommy said “When I was at work, did you play
with the puppy?” The boy said, “Yes;” deontic: The Mommy said,
“Now that I’m home, can we please play with the puppy?” The boy
said “Okay”) and “tell” (epistemic: The Mommy said “When I was
at work, did you play with the puppy?” The boy said, “Yes;”
deontic: The Mommy said, “Now that I’m home, you must play
179. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
180. There were 2,573 question-answer pairs where either the attorney or
child used “ask” or “tell,” and 2,160 had grammatically ambiguous uses.
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with the puppy.” The boy said “Okay”). After each scenario,
participants were asked yes/no questions about whether a speaker
“asked” or “told.”
We found that children showed a tendency to claim that the
conversational partner who did the majority of the speaking (the
first conversational partner) was both “asking” and “telling.”
Hence, the children correctly affirmed that a person who asked for
information or permission was asking, but they also thought that
the person was telling. It was only by eleven years of age that
children started to show some understanding that a person who
asked for information was asking and not telling, and that a
person who commanded action was telling and not asking. A
surprising finding was that even the oldest children tended to
deny that a person who answered an information question was
“telling”; this was likely due to the fact that question respondents
in our scenarios uttered a single word. Children appeared to
define “telling” by the amount of speech. Further, children who
also spoke Spanish performed less well than English-only
speaking children in several respects.
These findings suggest that children develop the ability to
discriminate “ask” from “tell” in middle childhood, with Englishspeaking children developing the ability to discriminate accurately
by eleven-years-old for uses relating to requesting information and
demanding action. However, younger children and children in
Spanish-speaking homes tend to affirm that speakers are both
“asking” and “telling.” The results have disturbing implications
for how child witnesses will answer yes/no questions about asking
and telling when questioned about their interactions with
disclosure recipients and with suspects. Children may endorse
questions about disclosure recipients “telling” them information,
when they were in fact asked. At the same time, they may affirm
that adults who coached them to provide information were
“asking.”
With respect to suspects, children may endorse
questions about suspects “telling” them to do things, when the
suspects may have in fact made polite requests. This problem may
mask the extent to which suspects cajole children into acquiescing
in the abuse, which helps to explain children’s subsequent selfblame and secrecy. Conversely, children may affirm that suspects
“asked” them to do things when they were in fact ordered to do so.
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VI. CONCLUSION: ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS

A better understanding of how children recall and talk about
prior conversations could assist legal professionals in
investigating and litigating child abuse claims. Children’s
conversations with others are forensically relevant. Children’s
conversations with suspects can elucidate the dynamics of sexual
abuse, because perpetrators talk to children in order to seduce
them into acquiescing in sexual acts and in order to prevent them
from disclosing the abuse. Children’s conversations with others to
whom they have disclosed abuse can elucidate the dynamics of
sexual abuse disclosure, because others can influence children’s
reports. Adults may suspect abuse when none has occurred, and
they may wish to conceal abuse that the child has honestly
reported.
Our analysis of court transcripts suggested that there are a
number of problems with how attorneys question children about
their prior conversations in court.182 Prosecutors may be missing
opportunities to help jurors understand the dynamics of sexual
abuse by emphasizing coercive statements made by suspects
during the abuse, rather than seductive statements made before
abuse is initiated or inducements to secrecy made after abuse has
begun. Prosecutors and defense attorneys are asking a large
number of questions about children’s discussion of the abuse with
others, but their questions are often exceedingly specific, asking
about specific details of specific conversations with specific adults.
Prosecutors typically fail to ask children either why they failed to
disclose abuse initially or why they disclosed when they did. Both
prosecutors and defense attorneys ask predominantly yes/no
questions, which suppress narrative responses from children and
make it difficult to determine if children comprehend the
questions (because children tend to answer yes/no questions with
a simple “yes” or “no”).
It is likely that children can be asked about conversations
without taxing their developmental limitations if they are asked
about what they have said to others (and what others have said to
them) about various topics without expecting them to distinguish
among repeated conversations with similar content. We

182.

Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19.
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recommend that legal professionals and others questioning
children ask them what the suspect “said to you” about abuse
(using the child’s words to describe abuse) and about talking to
other people about the abuse. In order to ask about possible
seduction by the suspect, children can be asked “tell me about
things you did with [the suspect] before he started touching you.”
With respect to the disclosure of abuse, one can ask the child
“how did people find out about” the abuse and “who did you first
tell about” the abuse. Children are likely to recall their first
disclosure, and they are likely to have difficulty recalling specific
subsequent disclosures because of the memorability of the first
occurrence.183 The interviewer can follow up by asking the child
to “tell me everything you said to [the disclosure recipient] about”
the abuse, and “what did [the disclosure recipient] say” and “what
did [the disclosure recipient] do” after the child disclosed. In order
to understand the child’s reasons for disclosure and nondisclosure, the interviewer can ask “what kept you from telling
right away” and “what made you want to tell [the disclosure
recipient],” and “how did you feel when you told [the disclosure
recipient]” and “what did you think when you told [the disclosure
recipient].” In order to inquire into external pressures and
influences, the interviewer can ask the child what various
potentially influential adults have said about the suspect, about
the abuse, and about talking to others about the abuse (including
the interviewer). Understanding children’s ability to recall
conversations, both in general and with respect to abuse
allegations, is a promising area for further research. Researchers
have called the study of memory for conversations the “orphan
child of witness memory research.”184 We have found very little
experimental work examining children’s memories for
conversations. Only a few studies have examined how children
talk about their disclosures of abuse.185
183. See Martine B. Powell, Donald M. Thomson, & Stephen J. Ceci,
Children’s Memory of Recurring Events: Is the First Event Always the Best
Remembered? 17 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 127–46 (2003).
184. Deborah Davis & Richard D. Friedman, Memory for Conversation:
The Orphan Child of Witness Memory Researchers, 1 HANDBOOK OF
EYEWITNESS MEMORY 1, 3 (2007).
185. Irit Hershowitz, Omer Lanes, & Michael E. Lamb, Exploring the
Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse with Alleged Victims and Their Parents, 31
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 111, 115 (2006); Lindsay C. Malloy, Sonja P.
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The areas deserving future work include children’s memories
for specific conversational interactions, children’s understanding
of the ways in which others can influence one’s memory reports,
and children’s understanding of the linguistic devices used to
describe conversations (such as the distinctions between “ask” and
“tell”). This work will enable us to make clearer recommendations
for child interviewers so that children’s reports can be assessed
accurately.

Brubacher, & Michael E. Lamb, “Because She’s One Who Listens”: Children
Discuss Disclosure Recipients in Forensic Interviews, 18 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 245, 246–47 (2013); SAS & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 61, at 81.

